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Incentive Effects of Risk Pooling, Redistributive and 
Savings Arrangements in Unemployment Benefit Systems: 
Evidence from a Job-Search Model for Brazil 
 
We develop a model of job search and use it to assess the effects that the Brazilian 
unemployment benefit system has on exit rates from unemployment. In our setup, 
unemployed workers receive job offers from the formal and informal sectors and decide 
whether to accept them or wait. Only jobs in the formal sector come with unemployment 
benefits. After incorporating the rules of the Brazilian unemployment benefit system we 
estimate the parameters of the model using its labor force survey (a rotating panel). Key 
parameters determining model dynamics are: the distribution of wage offers for each 
individual; the observed probabilities of separation from formal and informal jobs; and the 
unobserved job offers arrival rates. The results show that, in general, workers eligible for 
unemployment benefits also have higher offer rates – their unobserved characteristic are 
correlated with more job opportunities. Policy simulations ten suggest that the risk pooling 
and savings component of the unemployment benefit system have small effects on the 
probabilities of remaining unemployed. The main effect of both schemes is to reduce 
transitions into informal jobs. The effects are larger for unskilled workers, particularly women. 
The simulations also show that current effects are conditioned on the design of the system. 
More generous unemployment benefits, for instance, could substantially increase the share 
of workers who remain unemployed. In addition, asking workers to contribute to finance 
unemployment benefits would reduce formal employment. 
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 1.  Introduction 
Most middle and low income countries rely on severance pay as the mechanism to provide income 
protection to workers.  These systems are regulated through the labor code and offer workers a lump-sum 
upon separation, which is a function of the length of the employment spell. For instance, one month of 
salaries for each year of employment. There are three important flaws with these systems. First, because 
employers do not provision for their severance liabilities workers are exposed to the risk of default (see 
Saavedra, 2005).  Second, certifying eligibility for severance pay can be a complex and long process often 
involving courts (see Holzmann and Vodopivec, 2011). And third, severance pay increases the cost of lay-offs 
and can reduce turnover (see Kugler, 1999; Gonzaga, 2003; and Saavedra and Torero, 2004) and employment 
creation (see Pages and Montenegro, 1999; Montenegro and Pages, 2003; Elmeskob et al. (forthcoming)).   
Despite these flaws, however, countries have been slow in moving to other forms of unemployment 
benefits systems, either classic unemployment insurance (risk pooling) or unemployment savings accounts.   
One of the reasons is the belief that providing unemployment benefits can increase the unemployment rate 
and lead to unsustainable fiscal costs.  The unemployment rate can increase through two channels. First, 
because reservation wages increase and workers may be less likely to accept job offers at prevailing wages. 
Second, because workers can have lower incentives to search for and keep jobs.  Enforcing job search and 
controlling abuse is difficult, particularly when there is a large informal sector and institutional capacity is 
week. Clearly, unemployment benefits also have a potential upside at the micro level.  Even if workers spend 
more time unemployed, they may also be more effective searching for jobs and have more flexibility in 
choosing among them, which can lead to better matches for their skills. Nonetheless, concerns with “moral 
hazard” have dominated the policy debate. 
Most of the evidence about the incentive effects of unemployment benefits (UB), however, comes 
from  high  income  countries  and  even  there  it  is  mixed.  The  first  studies  on  the  effect  of  classic 
unemployment insurance showed that higher benefits – either a higher replacement rate or a longer duration 
– did increase the length of the unemployment spell and the unemployment rate (for reviews see Holmlund, 
1998; Vodopivec et al, 2005; and Olinto et al., 2007). The estimated benefit elasticity was in the 0.2-0.9 range, 
whereas the duration elasticity was in the 0.4-0.5 range.  These studies also found little evidence of better 
matches.  More recent studies for Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland and Spain show, on the contrary, 
that thanks to unemployment benefits workers are able to find more stable jobs, and that even if the length of 
the unemployment spell increases, the net effect is positive (Tatsiramos, 2009).   
   Among middle income countries the empirical evidence is quite scant and also inconclusive given the 
difficulties in separating the effect of the UB system from the effect of unobserved individual characteristics.  
Two studies for Brazil find no meaningful effect of the UB system on the duration of the unemployment 
spell.  The  first  exploited  changes  in  eligibility  conditions  and  showed  that,  if  anything,  unemployment 
benefits allowed faster transitions into self-employment (Cuningham, 2000).  A second compared the exit rates from unemployment among formal sector workers (eligible for unemployment benefits) and informal 
sector workers (not eligible for unemployment benefits).   It showed that the former had higher exit rates 
even after trying to control for unobserved characteristics that are correlated with work in the formal sector 
(Margolis, 2008). At the other extreme, van Ours and Vodopivec (2009) show that in the case of Slovenia the 
shortening of the potential duration of UI benefits reduced substantially the length of the unemployment 
spell.   
We argue that even if one had conclusive evidence about how the presence of a given unemployment 
benefit system affects workers behaviors, it would be of little help for policymaking. Indeed, at the end, it is 
likely  that  the  effect  of  an  unemployment  benefit  system  on  workers’  behaviors  depends  on  particular 
designs, not only in terms of the level and duration of benefits but more importantly on how it combines risk 
pooling,  savings,  and  redistributional  arrangements.  Thus,  from  a  policy  perspective,  the  more  relevant 
question is how individuals would respond to alternative designs of the UB system. Responding to this 
question requires having a (behavioral) model linking a generic unemployment benefit systems to decisions 
regarding job search and the acceptance of job offers. 
In this paper we analyze, ex-ante, how different changes in the rules of the Brazilian UB would affect 
exit rates from unemployment.  To this end, we develop and estimate a model of job-search that takes 
detailed  account  of  both  the  Brazilian  unemployment  insurance  system  and  the  unemployment  savings 
accounts (FGTS).  For tractability, the focus is on the effects that alternative components of the system have 
on the decision to accept job offers. Thus, we do not analyze how unemployment benefits affect the decisions 
to search for and keep jobs; these are modeled as exogenous factors.  These decisions are of course critical and 
ignoring  them  hides  an  important  part  of  the  story.    Still,  a  better  understanding  of  how  changes  in 
unemployment  benefit  systems  affect  reservation  wages  and  through  these  channel  transitions  out  of 
unemployment can already help improve the design of current arrangements.    
  The core of the paper is organized in six sections.  Sections 2 and 3 presents the structural model and 
the data used in the estimation. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy and its results while section 5 
presents the simulation results. Section 6 concludes. The Brazilian unemployment benefit system is described 
in the annex. Also in the annex we discuss identification issues and show numerically that the likelihood 
function has indeed a unique solution. 
 
2. The Model 
We focus on the decision to accept a given job offer.  At each time  , unemployed individuals can be 
offered a formal or informal sector job and need to decide whether to take it or wait for another offer.  In 
part because of tractability, we deviate from the standard job-search models (see Diamond, 1982; Mortensen, 
1986; and Pissarides, 1990 and new applications such as Vroman et al., 2009) where fully rational workers solve a Bellman equation that capture the utility gains/losses of taking a job or waiting for the next offer.1  
Instead, we assume that individuals are quasi -myopic. They do not solve the full recursive  optimization 
problem but look ahead a given number of periods and project expected revenues taking into account the risk 
of separation from the job.  Depending on whether the job is formal (F) or informal (I) its expected monetary 
value is given by: 
              
      
 
               
 
 
      
 
               
   
                   
        ,     (1) 
where                     is the realization of the wage in sector   (formal or informal),   is the growth rate 
of  wages,     is  a  discount  rate,      is  the  probability  of  separation  from  the  job  in  sector   ,      are  the 
accumulations of acquired rights in unemployment savings accounts,    the number of months individuals 
can receive unemployment benefits,    is the replacement rate,   is the number of salaries in the form of 
unemployment benefits that the worker can carry over if working, and   is the planning horizon.2   
Simplifying, we have: 
           ,             (2) 
where        
     
   
    
          
  
    
  and       
           
       .  
Individuals also calculate the monetary value of the decision to “wait” for another job offer. It is given by:   
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where     is the replacement rate that the individual receives at time t (for the long-term unemployed     is 
likely to be zero) and    and     are the probabilities of being offered a formal or informal sector job at time 
t> .3 The expectations operator   is introduced because at time       the realization of the wage for the 
offered job is not known. 
 
                                                           
1 One of the reasons for this formulation of the problem is the presence of savings in the Brazilian unemployment 
benefit system which complicates considerably the standard recursive problem. Workers deciding whether to take 
a job offer or not would need to simultaneously compute their optimal savings rate. The other reasons are the 
complexities of the unemployment insurance system which has discontinuities in benefits that depend on the 
vesting period and income levels.  
2 Formals jobs come with other benefits such as pensions that are not considered here for tractability.  We also 
ignore the social security contribution that workers pay to finance these benefits.  The implicit assumption is that 
the contributions are linked to benefits.    
3 These probabilities depend on the duration of the unemployment spell. To simplify the notation we ignore this 
point here.  It will be taken into account later in the estimation of the model. Simplifying, we have:4 
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Assuming that individuals are risk neutral or risk adverse, a job offer (      or      ) will be taken as long 
as5: 
                         (5) 
  This simple setup allows to explicitly define the reservation wage    as: 
  
   
       
  
            (6) 
  Notice that the reservation wage is sector dependent. This means that if         , then   
       
 , 
which means that employees compensate the lack of future benefits by increasing their reservation wage. 
Also,  from  equation  (6)  and  consistently  with  other  findings  in  the  literature,6  we see that an increase 
(decrease) in  unemployment benefits or  in the expected wages lead s  to an increase (decrease) in the 
reservation wage. 
This simply setup  implies that  increasing unemployment benefits increases the value of waiting 
(individuals are likely to stay unemployed for lon ger) but also the value of formal job  offers relative to 
informal job offers. Increasing accumulations on the unemployment individual accounts, on the other hand, 
increases the value of formal sector jobs  only and through this channel the value of waiting  if workers get 
informal sector job offers.  In other words, savings would not increase the length of the unemployment spell 
if only formal sector jobs were offered .  With informal offers, however, savings do provide incentives to 
wait.7  
The model as currently setup can be used to predict transition probabilities out of unemployment  
that depend on the rules of the unemployment benefit system. To do so, one needs to know (estimate) the 
distribution of offered wages for different individuals, their growth rate ( ), the offer arrival rates (     ) 
                                                           
4 Since in Brazil only formal workers are entitled to UI benefits, equation 4 simplifies to            
     
            
   
  )  1+         )(1+ )  1        )(1+ ) 1 (     +     ) 
5 Notice that we do not take into account preferences on leisure. Since individuals are seeking for jobs, we assume 
that the decision of participating in the labor force has already been taken. 
6 See, for instance, Wolpin (1987). 
7 Here it is important to observe that this result is particular to the Brazilian system where savings are financed by 
employers.  If savings were financed directly from workers’ contributions (meaning higher savings would imply 
lower wages) and the interest rate paid was equal to workers’ discount rate, savings would drop from equation (1).   which will depend on the unemployment duration and the discount rate. This can be done if one has access 
to a panel with data on wages and other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics for  individuals 
transiting  out  of  unemployment  or  staying  unemployed.  Section  4  presents  the  details  of  the  proposed 
estimation strategy and the results. Before doing so, we introduce the data used in our application for Brazil. 
3. Data Used to Estimate the Model 
We work with the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), or Monthly Employment Survey, which is a 
monthly  rotating  panel  of  dwellers  in  six  metropolitan  areas  in  Brazil  (São  Paulo,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Belo 
Horizonte, Salvador, Porto Alegre and Recife), compiled by the  Instituto Nacional de Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE), or Brazilian National Statistical Agency. These six metropolitan areas cover approximately 25% of 
the country's population. The PME survey was redesigned in March, 2002. We used data since then until 
August, 2010. 
The survey investigates schooling, labor force, demographic, and earnings characteristics of each 
resident aged 10 or more that lives in the interviewed households. This results in approximately 100,000 
individuals  from  35,000  households  every  month.  The  rotating  scheme  is  as  follows.  Households  are 
interviewed once per month during four consecutive months after which they stay out of the survey for an 
eight-month window. After this period, the household is interviewed again for another four month period. 
Once this last spell is finished, the household is permanently excluded from the sample. Households are 
divided into four rotating groups, in order to make sure that in two consecutive months 75% of the sample is 
the same.  The PME does not identifies individuals directly, only their households. Thus, to create a sample 
of individuals a matching process needs to take place. We match individuals within households over time 
using date of birth (month and year) and gender. 
The dataset used for the estimation and the simulations was built based on monthly transitions. We 
match  individuals  that  were  surveyed  for  two  consecutive  months  and  consider  this  matching  as  an 
observation.  Characteristics  such  as  gender,  age,  marital  status  and  schooling  are  taken  from  the  first 
interview, together with labor status. The subsequent interview is used only to provide the new labor status. 
Since we are interested in modeling the decision of leaving unemployment, out of all the observations, we use 
only those that contain individuals unemployed at time  .  As discussed in Robalino et al. (2009), we define 
formal workers as those who have a signed labor card (signed carteira). Self employed, civil servants and 
employers were excluded from the sample, since we are focusing at this point only on transitions from 
unemployment to an offered job, either formal or informal.8  
There is one critical piece of information needed for the model that is not part of the survey: the 
actual  number of monthly unemployment   benefits  unemployed individuals have the right to  cash. To 
                                                           
8 A full model would need to take into account simultaneously choices among three types of jobs: formal wage 
earner, informal wage earner, and self-employment.  In this version of the paper we are assuming implicitly that 
the workers who remained in the sample did not find self-employment opportunities that were worth it.  For them 
the relevant decision was only whether to take formal or informal sector jobs.  overcome this, a synthetic variable was built based on the length of the observed unemployment spell and 
that of previous job (if formal).  Indeed, only individuals who were fired from a formal job are entitled to 
receive UI benefits and the number of payments depends on the number of months workers stayed on the 
former job.  Since the PME survey asks to those who are unemployed whether the last job was formal or 
informal, how long they worked, what was the wage, and why they left, it is trivial to build this synthetic 
variable.9 
All matched individuals, regardless of their labor status, summed a total of  4,817,690 observations. 
Considering only the unemployed that transit into formal or informal sector jobs or remained unemployed  
resulted in a dataset with 181,763 observations (3.8% of the total). Table 1 presents some simple descriptive 
statistics of the data set.  We see that we have a quite diverse sample of individuals both in terms of gender, 
education, ethnicity, and geographic location.  It is worth noting that among the eligible, the percentage of 
males and educated workers is higher than in the general population.  The average age of the eligible is also 
higher while the length of the unemployment spell is much lower (2 vs. 8 months).    
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
   Eligible     Non eligible     Entire sample 
 
#  %  Std. Dev. 
 
#  %  Std. Dev. 
 
#  %  Std. Dev. 
Male  6,149  62%  - 
 
73,899  43%  - 
 
80,048  44%  - 
Female  3,776  38%  - 
 
97,939  57%  - 
 
101,715  56%  - 
Married  4,429  45%  - 
 
110,296  64%  - 
 
114,725  63%  - 
Not married  5,496  55%  - 
 
61,542  36%  - 
 
67,038  37%  - 
0-7 years of education  2,074  21%  - 
 
44,692  26%  - 
 
46,766  26%  - 
8-10 years of education  2,025  20%  - 
 
39,075  23%  - 
 
41,100  23%  - 
11+ years of education  5,826  59%  - 
 
88,071  51%  - 
 
93,897  52%  - 
White  4,880  49%  - 
 
69,649  41%  - 
 
71,916  40%  - 
Non-white  5,045  51%  - 
 
102,189  59%  - 
 
103,084  57%  - 
Region of Recife  800  8%  - 
 
18,404  11%  - 
 
45,550  25%  - 
Region of Salvador  1,382  14%  - 
 
39,028  23%  - 
 
31,860  18%  - 
Region of Belo Horizonte  1,618  16%  - 
 
22,341  13%  - 
 
23,028  13%  - 
Region of Rio de Janeiro  1,470  15%  - 
 
31,690  18%  - 
 
17,010  9%  - 
Region of São Paulo  3,089  31%  - 
 
44,258  26%  - 
 
38,584  21%  - 
Region of Porto Alegre  1,566  16%  -     16,117  9%  -     18,709  10%  - 
Average age  31.2  -  9.6    29.5  -  10.3    29.6  -  10.3 
Average unemployment 
spell (months)  2.0  -  3.1    8.1  -  11.1    7.8  -  11.0 
Total observations  9,925  100%  -     171,838  100%  -     181,763  100%  - 
Source: PME (IBGE); Authors' calculations  
 
                                                           
9 Unemployed individuals who are not receiving unemployment benefit because these run out are considered 
ineligible – even if they were eligible when they first became unemployed.  This is important for the estimation, 
since these workers face the same optimization problem as those who became unemployed but did not have 
unemployment benefits.  It is likely, however, that eligible workers who run out of benefits have unobserved 
characteristics that distinguishs them both from the eligible receiving benefits and the “truly” not-eligible.  In this 
version of the paper, however, they are classified as non-eligible.   After following the procedure described above, there were a total of 9,925 unemployed individuals 
(or 5.5% of the sample) eligible for unemployment benefits (see bottom line of Table 1). For this subgroup, 
Table  2  displays  statistics  about the  replacement  rates  and  the  (synthetic)  number  of  installments  to  be 
cashed. The lowest replacement rate is slightly above 30% while the maximum is 100%. The average number 
of remaining benefits is 1.85, the minimum is obviously 1 (if the person is not receiving unemployment 
benefits she is considered not eligible) and the maximum is 4. It is important to note that workers can receive 
3,  4  or  5  monthly  benefits  depending  on  the  amount  of  time  spent  in  a  formal  job.  Nevertheless,  the 
maximum number we see in Table 2 is 4 because we consider that the eligible unemployed individuals already 
cashed at least one benefit. 




Rate    
Number of benefits 
to be cashed 
Mean  0.752 
 
1.852 
Std. dev.  0.114 
 
0.904 
Median  0.800 
 
2 
Minimum  0.315 
 
1 
Maximum  1.000 
 
4 
Source: Authors' calculations based on PME (IBGE) 
 
  Tables 3a and 3b displays the frequencies of unemployed individuals for different groups transiting 
to formal and informal jobs.  We again see that transitions into formal jobs are more common among 
workers eligible for unemployment benefits.  Transitions into formal jobs are also more common in the 
South and South East than in the North, and among adult rather than young workers.  The effect of 
education, on the other hand, is less clear.   
  Table 3a – Observed transitions from unemployment, non-eligible individuals 




Formal jobs    Informal jobs 
#  %    #  % 
Male 
0-7 years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  9,945  326  3.3%    770  7.7% 
Northeast  5,575  65  1.2%    257  4.6% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  3,580  104  2.9%    324  9.1% 
Northeast  2,672  16  0.6%    146  5.5% 
8-10 years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  5,631  200  3.6%    318  5.6% 
Northeast  2,930  48  1.6%    120  4.1% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  6,921  215  3.1%    472  6.8% 
Northeast  3,121  25  0.8%    107  3.4% 
11+ years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  11,377  393  3.5%    401  3.5% 
Northeast  5,824  116  2.0%    146  2.5% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  11,502  430  3.7%    513  4.5% 
Northeast  4,821  78  1.6%    144  3.0% 
Female 
0-7 years 
> 24 years  South/Southeast  12,095  177  1.5%    737  6.1% 
Northeast  5,649  21  0.4%    214  3.8% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  3,193  36  1.1%    174  5.4% 
Northeast  1,983  3  0.2%    78  3.9% 
8-10 years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  7,250  137  1.9%    291  4.0% 
Northeast  3,413  17  0.5%    78  2.3% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  6,496  115  1.8%    310  4.8% 
Northeast  3,313  20  0.6%    84  2.5% 
11+ years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  18,739  440  2.3%    626  3.3% 
Northeast  10,124  88  0.9%    194  1.9% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  17,677  528  3.0%    820  4.6% 
Northeast  8,007  75  0.9%    195  2.4% 
Source: Authors' calculations based on PME (IBGE) 
 Table 3b – Observed transitions from unemployment, eligible individuals 




Formal jobs    Informal jobs 
#  %    #  % 
Male 
0-7 years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  1,047  47  4.5%    83  7.9% 
Northeast  333  9  2.7%    9  2.7% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  190  8  4.2%    9  4.7% 
Northeast  65  0  0.0%    3  4.6% 
8-10 years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  747  55  7.4%    51  6.8% 
Northeast  179  4  2.2%    3  1.7% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  425  23  5.4%    27  6.4% 
Northeast  95  1  1.1%    4  4.2% 
11+ years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  1,561  102  6.5%    75  4.8% 
Northeast  527  16  3.0%    21  4.0% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  789  31  3.9%    37  4.7% 
Northeast  191  2  1.0%    8  4.2% 
Female 
0-7 years 
> 24 years  South/Southeast  318  9  2.8%    31  9.7% 
Northeast  53  2  3.8%    2  3.8% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  61  2  3.3%    5  8.2% 
Northeast  7  0  0.0%    0  0.0% 
8-10 years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  320  7  2.2%    22  6.9% 
Northeast  76  4  5.3%    2  2.6% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  158  10  6.3%    6  3.8% 
Northeast  25  0  0.0%    1  4.0% 
11+ years 
> 24 years 
South/Southeast  1,347  44  3.3%    55  4.1% 
Northeast  424  9  2.1%    5  1.2% 
<= 24 years 
South/Southeast  780  53  6.8%    35  4.5% 
Northeast  207  4  1.9%    3  1.4% 
Source: Authors' calculations based on PME (IBGE) 
 
4. Estimation Strategy  
The estimation proceeds in two steps.  Step 1 focuses on the parameters that we consider exogenous 
to the behavioral model, namely the distribution of wage offers and the probabilities of separation from 
formal and informal jobs (respectively,         and   ). Step 2 involves estimating the parameters of the 
behavioral  model,  which  determine  the  transition  probabilities  out  of  unemployment  into  formal  and 
informal jobs (  ).  
We begin with the description of the methods used in Step 1. To estimate the wage equation we used 
a Heckman two-step procedure. The estimation was done separately for formal and informal wages. To 
control for selection, for each group, we estimated jointly the probability of moving out of unemployment 
into  a  formal  or  informal  job  and  the  wage  equation.  The  later  uses  standard  demographic,  social  and education variables.  Both models were estimated using dummies for regions and months.   The results are 
presented in Table 4.    
Table 4 – Wage and Employment: Heckman Selection Model 
      Informal     Formal    

















Age  -0.009*  (0.004) 
 
0.003  (0.005) 
  Age squared  0.000  (0.000) 
 
-0.000*  (0.000) 
  Lenght of unemp. Spell  -0.018***  (0.001) 
 
-0.020***  (0.002) 
  Lenght of unemp. spell squared  0.000***  (0.000) 
 
0.000***  (0.000) 
  Female  -0.108***  (0.011) 
 
-0.219***  (0.015) 
  Chief of the household  0.087***  (0.015) 
 
0.112***  (0.019) 
  Has worked before  0.160***  (0.018) 
 
0.167***  (0.024) 
  Married  -0.032*  (0.015) 
 
0.077***  (0.019) 
  Children under 6  0.043**  (0.016) 
 
0.029  (0.021) 
  0-3 years of education
[1]  0.316***  (0.023) 
 
-0.213***  (0.036) 
  4-7 years of education
[1]  0.266***  (0.015) 
 
-0.176***  (0.020) 
  8-10 years of education
[1]  0.126***  (0.014) 
 
-0.121***  (0.018) 
  Log(weekly working hours)  -1.857***  (0.036) 
 
0.521***  (0.069) 
  Log(desired weekly working hours)  1.724***  (0.048) 
 
-0.106  (0.077) 
  Metropolitan area and month dummies  Yes 
   
Yes 
    Regional unemployment rate  -0.027***  (0.005) 
 
-0.056***  (0.008) 
  Trend  -0.000  (0.000) 
 















Log(weekly working hours)  0.489***  (0.040) 
 
-0.016  (0.036) 
  Age  0.033***  (0.004) 
 
0.032***  (0.004) 
  Age squared  -0.000***  (0.000) 
 
-0.000***  (0.000) 
  Female  -0.126***  (0.013) 
 
-0.146***  (0.013) 
  White or asian  0.109***  (0.014) 
 
0.089***  (0.012) 
  0-3 years of education
[1]  -0.412***  (0.027) 
 
-0.308***  (0.031) 
  4-7 years of education
[1]  -0.302***  (0.018) 
 
-0.254***  (0.017) 
  8-10 years of education
[1]  -0.222***  (0.017) 
 
-0.146***  (0.015) 
  Metropolitan area dummies  Yes 
   
Yes 
    Trend  0.004***  (0.000) 
 
0.001***  (0.000) 
  Intercept  3.345***  (0.109) 
 
6.009***  (0.183) 
 
  Rho  0.291  0.052 
 
-0.271  0.074 
 
  Sigma  0.567  0.008 
 
0.363  0.008 
 
  Lambda  0.165  0.032 
 
-0.099  0.029 
 








  LR test of indep. equations. (Rho = 0): Prob. >     0.000     0.002    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. [1] Reference is 11 or more years of education 
Source: authors' calculation based on PME (IBGE) 
 
It is important to clarify that the estimation was done using the same database described in the 
previous section. This means that selection (employment at time t) was estimated using all individuals that 
were unemployed at t-1, whereas wage equations were estimated based on the first salaries received by those who exited unemployment.10  We see that all parameters have the e xpected sign and most are significant. 
Particularly, women and the less educated have lower wages, even after controlling for participation.  In 
addition, the number of children under the age of 6 and being the chief of the household increase the 
probability of  participation in formal jobs. One interpretation is that married workers with families have 
stronger incentives to find formal sector jobs that, for instance, offer social security benefits.  At the same 
time, being in geographic areas with a high unemployment rate and where finding jobs takes longer provides 
incentives to take informal sector jobs.   
Table 5 – Unemployment Risk Logit Equations 
   Informal employee 
 
Formal employee    
  
Marginal 
Effect  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
 
Marginal 
Effect  Coeff.  Std. Err.    
Age  -0.00045***  -0.021***  (0.001) 
 
-0.00013***  -0.019***  (0.001) 
  Lenght of employment spell  -0.00049***  -0.023***  (0.000) 
 
-0.00012***  -0.019***  (0.000) 
  Lenght of employment spell squared  0.00000***  0.000***  (0.000) 
 
0.00000***  0.000***  (0.000) 
  Female  -0.00237***  -0.110***  (0.019) 
 
0.00008  0.012  (0.023) 
  White
[1]  -0.00420  -0.198  (0.196) 
 
-0.00272  -0.410  (0.239) 
  Asian
[1]  -0.00802  -0.465  (0.238) 
 
-0.00262  -0.510  (0.286) 
  Black
[1]  0.00196  0.089  (0.197) 
 
-0.00139  -0.233  (0.240) 
  'Pardo'
[1]  -0.00092  -0.043  (0.196) 
 
-0.00224  -0.357  (0.239) 
  Married  -0.00163**  -0.077**  (0.024) 
 
-0.00185***  -0.279***  (0.026) 
  Married*Female  -0.00345***  -0.168***  (0.031) 
 
-0.00045  -0.071  (0.038) 
  Number of dwellers in household  0.00085***  0.040***  (0.004) 
 
0.00021***  0.033***  (0.005) 
  0-3 years of education
[2]  0.00486***  0.210***  (0.029) 
 
0.00140***  0.197***  (0.044) 
  4-7 years of education
[2]  0.00366***  0.166***  (0.020) 
 
0.00103***  0.151***  (0.026) 
  8-10 years of education
[2]  0.00461***  0.204***  (0.020) 
 
0.00172***  0.244***  (0.023) 
  Unemployment rate  0.00149***  0.070***  (0.007) 
 
0.00017**  0.027**  (0.009) 
  Log(weekly working hours)  -0.00759***  -0.355***  (0.016) 
 
0.00088**  0.134**  (0.048) 
  Trend  0.00002*  0.001*  (0.000) 
 
0.00000  0.001  (0.001) 
  Constant    -1.133***  (0.219) 
 
  -3.609***  (0.316)    
N  549,707 
 
1,363,994 
  Pseudo-R2  0.0799 
 
0.0524 
  [1] Reference is indian 
[2] Reference is 11 or more years of education 
Note: region and month dummies were included in the estimations 
Source: Authors' calculations based on PME (IBGE) 
 
The probabilities of separation from formal and informal jobs were estimated using a simple logit 
model. The dataset used for this purpose included all the matched individuals that were working at time  . 
                                                           
10 Clearly, we do not observe the true distribution of offered wages (only the accepted wages) and it is not possible 
to correct for this with our current data.    This can lead to overestimate the level of offered wages and therefore 
underestimate job offer rates.  This is, however, unlikely to affect our analysis of the effects, at the margin, of the 
unemployment benefit systems on transition rates towards formal and informal jobs.   Hence, the dichotomous left hand side variable takes the value of 1 if the person becomes unemployed at 
time       or 0 otherwise.  The results of the logits are presented in Table 5 and are consistent with our 
priors. In particular, those who have a lower risk of becoming unemployed are men, older, educated and 
married workers.  Also, the longer individuals have been employed and the more hours they work the lower 
the probability of separation.  
Step 2 is somewhat more complex. For every individual transiting from state 0 (unemployed) to state 
  (             or                ) we define the probabilities:   
                                                                 
                                                    
and 
                                       
where           gives the probability that the job taken provides better utility than waiting and is given by: 
                                                
                                          
Similarly,            gives the probability that the job taken provides better utility than a job offer that could 
have been received from the other sector (  ) and is given by:   
                                            
                                                  
Regarding the offer probabilities, the assumption made is slightly different than usual. Normally, 
more than one offer is allowed to arrive at each period of time following, for instance, a Poisson process. For 
simplicity, here we assume that only one “credible” formal and one informal offer can be received each 
month.  This offer depends on the length of the unemployment spell and on a time trend, allowing for non-
stationarity (see Van den Berg, 1990). Thus we assume that the offer probabilities are given by: 
     
 
                                   (7) 
where       is the number of months that individual   is unemployed and   is a trend variable (March/2002 
= 1 and July/2010 = 101). 
The goal therefore is to estimate a vector of six parameters                    .  We do this by 
maximizing the log likelihood function: 
                                       
 
 To calculate this likelihood function we need simulated values for     and         .   The calculation 
of      is straightforward (recall equation 1).11 The parameter    is estimated in the first step,   was assumed 
to be 6% per year,    comes from the wage equation (the trend variable), and    and    are calculated based 
on Brazilian social protection rules. The only missing variable is    which is calculated by dividing the benefit 
that the worker would be given if fired (again based on the system’s rules) and the expected wage given by the 
wage equation estimated in the first step. Given    ,          can also be easily calculated. Contrary to    , 
however,          needs to be estimated at each iteration of the likelihood maximization routine, since its 
value depends on the value of the job offers arrival rates.    
To take into account unobserved heterogeneity that affects the offer rates, the estimation was done 
for 48 different groups of individuals based on gender, education (low, medium and high12), age (up to 24 
years old or more), region (Northeast or South/Southeast) and current eligibility for unemployment benefits 
(eligible and non-eligible).  However,  in the case of eligible workers,  some of the subsets had very few 
observations, which caused the optimization to either not converge or to produce statistically insignificant 
estimates. Thus, for them the parameters were estimated at a higher level of aggregation excluding age and 
region.    
Tables 6a, 6b, 7a and 7b show the results for the six parameters estimated for the 30 resulting groups 
(24 non-eligible and 6 eligible). In order to facilitate the interpretation of the parameters    ,    and   , the 
tables also show the resulting average offer probabilities. The numbers in parenthesis indicate the standard 
errors calculated using a re-sampling bootstrap approach. 
The  results  show  that  job  arrival  rates  are  systematically  higher  among  those  eligible  for 
unemployment benefits relative to the non-eligible. Offer probabilities are also systematically higher for men 
than for women, regardless of education, age, region or eligibility conditions.  These results are interesting 
because  they  suggest  that  the  failure  of  previous  studies  for  Brazil  to  find  a  meaningful  effect  of  the 
unemployment benefit system on formal and informal employment can be explained by the inability to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity.  Our results suggests that, other things being equal,  those eligible for 
unemployment benefits are also  more likely to get job offers presumably because their unobserved cognitive 
and non-cognitive skills are in higher demand and/or because they   have better information and broader 
social networks.  Unemployment benefits could also give them more possibilities.  For instance, they could 
hire  counselors  or  buy  better  clothing.  Nonetheless,  all  these  scenarios  are  not  inconsistent  with  the 
                                                           
11 Given the complexities of the Brazilian unemployment benefit system – mainly discontinuities that depend on 
the vesting periods and minimums and maximums -- there are no closed form solutions for the true    .  These are 
simulated for each individual, but only once.  Indeed, the values of the     do not change between the iterations of 
the optimization routine for the likelihood function. 
12 Low educated individuals are those with up to 7 years of schooling; medium indicates a minimum of 8 and a 
maximum of 11, while highly educated are those with 12 or more years. possibility  that  because  of  the  unemployment  benefits,  eligible  individuals  might  also  invest  less  time 
searching for jobs (moral hazard) – an issue that we cannot address with our data.     
Table 6a – Parameters estimates for non-eligible men 
Education  Age group  Region 
 
θF  βF  τF  θI  βI  τI  νF  νI 
Low  Young  Northeast 
Mean  0.025  5.824  -0.011  0.018  1.992  -0.003  0.44%  12.11% 
Std dev  0.033  0.628  0.011  0.013  0.205  0.004  0.16%  1.14% 
t-ratio  0.77  9.27  -0.94  1.35  9.73  -0.76  2.70  10.61 
Medium  Young  Northeast 
Mean  0.048  6.002  -0.022  0.039  2.667  -0.010  0.63%  8.14% 
Std dev  0.050  0.682  0.010  0.020  0.314  0.005  0.15%  0.79% 
t-ratio  0.95  8.79  -2.26  2.01  8.50  -2.12  4.34  10.30 
High  Young  Northeast 
Mean  0.018  5.071  -0.015  0.033  2.138  -0.001  1.31%  9.08% 
Std dev  0.016  0.405  0.007  0.015  0.267  0.005  0.22%  0.84% 
t-ratio  1.08  12.52  -2.23  2.17  8.01  -0.17  5.93  10.85 
Low  Old  Northeast 
Mean  0.048  5.066  -0.016  0.020  2.310  -0.009  0.96%  11.13% 
Std dev  0.014  0.344  0.006  0.007  0.145  0.003  0.18%  0.82% 
t-ratio  3.56  14.75  -2.66  2.89  15.91  -3.36  5.21  13.64 
Medium  Old  Northeast 
Mean  0.041  5.038  -0.021  0.060  1.712  -0.002  1.49%  11.55% 
Std dev  0.014  0.424  0.006  0.015  0.224  0.004  0.24%  0.98% 
t-ratio  2.92  11.88  -3.34  4.00  7.64  -0.50  6.27  11.73 
High  Old  Northeast 
Mean  0.023  4.975  -0.021  0.027  2.464  -0.004  1.93%  7.89% 
Std dev  0.013  0.430  0.007  0.010  0.242  0.004  0.24%  0.66% 
t-ratio  1.69  11.57  -3.10  2.73  10.18  -0.97  8.09  12.04 
Low  Young  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.051  4.068  -0.012  0.079  0.728  -0.001  2.29%  25.56% 
Std dev  0.018  0.246  0.004  0.015  0.141  0.003  0.23%  1.22% 
t-ratio  2.78  16.53  -2.87  5.16  5.16  -0.41  10.03  20.94 
Medium  Young  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.063  3.902  -0.011  0.076  1.177  -0.006  2.52%  22.21% 
Std dev  0.018  0.214  0.003  0.014  0.137  0.002  0.19%  0.91% 
t-ratio  3.55  18.20  -3.27  5.56  8.58  -2.72  13.60  24.41 
High  Young  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.060  3.741  -0.010  0.071  1.430  -0.004  3.00%  17.12% 
Std dev  0.021  0.278  0.005  0.014  0.209  0.004  0.20%  0.92% 
t-ratio  2.89  13.46  -2.13  4.94  6.84  -1.06  14.69  18.52 
Low  Old  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.042  3.995  -0.014  0.053  1.026  -0.004  2.69%  23.09% 
Std dev  0.013  0.217  0.003  0.008  0.103  0.002  0.21%  0.78% 
t-ratio  3.25  18.41  -4.32  7.05  9.95  -1.98  12.80  29.77 
Medium  Old  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.069  3.742  -0.013  0.073  1.363  -0.006  3.13%  18.49% 
Std dev  0.013  0.198  0.003  0.012  0.152  0.003  0.24%  0.91% 
t-ratio  5.49  18.87  -4.18  6.17  8.99  -2.44  12.95  20.42 
High  Old  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.066  3.865  -0.017  0.083  1.789  -0.005  3.79%  12.15% 
Std dev  0.015  0.217  0.003  0.011  0.158  0.002  0.29%  0.71% 
t-ratio  4.42  17.84  -5.62  7.30  11.33  -2.01  12.91  17.05 
Note: Means and standard deviations were calculated using bootstrap resampling techniques 
Source: Authors' calculation using PME (IBGE) 
 Table 6b – Parameters estimates for non-eligible women 
Education  Age group  Region 
 
θF  βF  τF  θI  βI  τI  νF  νI 
Low  Young  Northeast 
Mean  0.587  30.662  -0.215  0.035  2.537  -0.006  0.14%  7.44% 
Std dev  2.951  276.715  2.684  0.021  0.342  0.006  0.08%  0.89% 
t-ratio  0.20  0.11  -0.08  1.65  7.41  -0.91  1.66  8.41 
Medium  Young  Northeast 
Mean  0.036  4.890  0.007  0.041  2.956  -0.009  0.50%  5.80% 
Std dev  0.059  0.540  0.010  0.019  0.305  0.005  0.12%  0.72% 
t-ratio  0.61  9.05  0.73  2.11  9.69  -1.85  4.10  8.07 
High  Young  Northeast 
Mean  0.042  5.467  -0.015  0.069  2.646  -0.006  0.77%  6.07% 
Std dev  0.023  0.417  0.006  0.016  0.282  0.004  0.27%  1.35% 
t-ratio  1.81  13.11  -2.52  4.43  9.38  -1.49  2.84  4.48 
Low  Old  Northeast 
Mean  0.028  6.397  -0.010  0.049  2.476  -0.008  0.24%  7.72% 
Std dev  0.024  0.762  0.014  0.010  0.169  0.003  0.07%  0.56% 
t-ratio  1.16  8.39  -0.76  4.75  14.61  -2.67  3.70  13.82 
Medium  Old  Northeast 
Mean  0.065  5.669  -0.008  0.061  2.528  0.000  0.38%  4.94% 
Std dev  0.043  0.645  0.012  0.022  0.313  0.006  0.18%  0.69% 
t-ratio  1.52  8.79  -0.69  2.71  8.08  0.07  2.04  7.17 
High  Old  Northeast 
Mean  0.031  5.389  -0.013  0.032  3.066  -0.004  0.75%  4.42% 
Std dev  0.012  0.317  0.004  0.009  0.242  0.004  0.10%  0.32% 
t-ratio  2.50  17.00  -2.93  3.46  12.70  -1.26  7.46  13.79 
Low  Young  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.121  4.940  -0.011  0.063  1.787  -0.004  0.74%  12.79% 
Std dev  0.058  0.496  0.008  0.018  0.180  0.003  0.15%  0.89% 
t-ratio  2.08  9.95  -1.28  3.42  9.90  -1.43  4.93  14.33 
Medium  Young  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.043  4.823  -0.016  0.070  1.865  -0.006  1.51%  13.01% 
Std dev  0.022  0.292  0.004  0.015  0.151  0.003  0.22%  0.91% 
t-ratio  1.91  16.51  -3.74  4.57  12.37  -2.43  6.88  14.37 
High  Young  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.074  4.023  -0.013  0.066  1.636  -0.005  2.55%  14.96% 
Std dev  0.013  0.206  0.004  0.011  0.170  0.003  0.13%  0.63% 
t-ratio  5.51  19.49  -3.75  6.02  9.60  -1.78  19.34  23.66 
Low  Old  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.059  5.088  -0.016  0.049  1.730  -0.006  1.01%  14.67% 
Std dev  0.013  0.242  0.004  0.007  0.096  0.002  0.09%  0.52% 
t-ratio  4.37  21.06  -4.13  7.18  17.99  -3.58  11.14  28.13 
Medium  Old  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.035  4.882  -0.016  0.068  1.922  -0.005  1.48%  11.11% 
Std dev  0.015  0.402  0.007  0.015  0.228  0.004  0.27%  1.34% 
t-ratio  2.26  12.14  -2.49  4.48  8.45  -1.24  5.48  8.31 
High  Old  South/Southeast 
Mean  0.044  4.321  -0.014  0.061  2.223  -0.006  2.33%  9.53% 
Std dev  0.011  0.234  0.004  0.009  0.167  0.002  0.16%  0.49% 
t-ratio  4.05  18.43  -3.90  7.14  13.33  -2.56  14.26  19.48 
Note: Means and standard deviations were calculated using bootstrap resampling techniques 
Source: Authors' calculation using PME (IBGE) 
 The results also show that formal jobs offers have been increasing over time.  Indeed, the parameters 
capturing the time trend are practically all negative and significant for formal offers.  For the informal offers, 
although some of the estimates are not significant, the pattern is the same.  Conversely, the duration of the 
unemployment spell is inversely related to the offer probabilities for both the eligible and the non-eligible 
individuals. For the eligible, this finding differs from what some of the empirical evidences suggest, since in 
some countries the search effort (and thus offer rates) increases when benefits exhaustion is approaching.  
The implication in the case of Brazil is that workers, even if they receive unemployment benefits, would like 
to get a job and are not waiting until the last minute to find one.  
Table 7a – Parameters estimates for eligible men 
Education 
 
θF  βF  τF  θI  βI  τI  νF  νI 
Low 
Mean  0.171  4.136  -0.022  0.284  0.930  -0.003  3.72%  22.49% 
Std dev  0.112  0.340  0.005  0.089  0.232  0.004  0.47%  1.93% 
t-ratio  1.52  12.16  -4.62  3.19  4.00  -0.81  7.85  11.66 
Medium 
Mean  0.097  3.235  -0.008  0.136  0.882  -0.003  4.83%  27.14% 
Std dev  0.084  0.284  0.004  0.098  0.293  0.004  0.55%  2.29% 
t-ratio  1.15  11.38  -1.77  1.39  3.01  -0.59  8.71  11.87 
High 
Mean  -0.011  4.009  -0.013  0.019  1.493  -0.003  3.91%  20.69% 
Std dev  0.069  0.360  0.004  0.055  0.234  0.003  0.64%  1.41% 
t-ratio  -0.17  11.14  -2.92  0.34  6.38  -0.99  6.08  14.73 
Note: Means and standard deviations were calculated using bootstrap resampling techniques 
Source: Authors' calculation using PME (IBGE) 
 
Table 7b – Parameters estimates for eligible women 
Education 
 
θF  βF  τF  θI  βI  τI  νF  νI 
Low 
Mean  0.406  3.970  -0.008  0.294  1.407  -0.020  1.99%  29.48% 
Std dev  0.339  0.978  0.014  0.253  0.569  0.010  0.69%  4.21% 
t-ratio  1.20  4.06  -0.57  1.16  2.47  -1.97  2.88  7.00 
Medium 
Mean  0.374  3.386  -0.004  0.099  1.064  -0.002  2.89%  25.22% 
Std dev  1.218  0.638  0.010  0.132  0.507  0.008  0.66%  3.96% 
t-ratio  0.31  5.30  0.47  0.75  2.10  -0.28  4.36  6.36 
High 
Mean  0.028  4.382  -0.020  0.193  1.726  -0.004  3.89%  13.87% 
Std dev  0.067  0.343  0.005  0.067  0.218  0.003  0.45%  1.11% 
t-ratio  0.42  12.79  -4.22  2.88  7.90  -1.24  8.70  12.50 
Note: Means and standard deviations were calculated using bootstrap resampling techniques 
Source: Authors' calculation using PME (IBGE) 
 
5. Policy Simulations 
We start by illustrating how the model can be used to analyze the effect of changes in unemployment 
benefits. Figure 1 graphs the value of an informal job offer (left panel) and a formal job offer (right panel) as a function of the value of waiting.  The figure refers to male, low-skilled workers who are older than 24 years,  
leave in the South or Southeast region and  are not eligible for unemployment benefits. In the figure, the 
offered wage considered when calculating the expected value of waiting is set at the average of each individual 
distribution, whereas a zero-mean shock is added to the expected wage used for the calculation of the formal 
and informal offers in order to mimic the observed wage distribution.13 We see that in the case of informal 
job offers, approximately half of the points  lie above the 45o line, meaning that a large portion of informal 
offers are refused. In such cases, individuals choose to wait for a higher wage or a formal sector job. For 
formal job offers, on the other hand, the majority of points are above the 45o line indicating that most 
individuals would accept a formal job offer (that pays the expected wage) instead of remaining unemployed. 
 In Figure 2 we reproduce the two panels but this time after giving unemployment assistance to all 
workers.  The value of the transfer is set to 40% of the mean of the worker’s wage distribution, and the 
benefit is paid as long as she is unemployed. We see that for both informal and formal job offers, a great 
share of the points move below the 45o line. Thus, a sizeable unemployment assistance transfer can have a 
sizeable  effect  on  exit  probabilities  from  unemployment  and,  as  predicted  by  theory,  increase  the 
unemployment rate. 
 
Figure 1 - Value function in baseline scenario (Men, non eligible, low education, 24 years old or 
more and south/southeast region) 
 
 
                                                           
13 The variance of the shock is calculated based on the difference of the observed variance and the variance 
obtained by the wage estimation equations (taking into account Heckman’s correction procedure) Figure 2 - Value function with Unemployment Assistance (Men, non eligible, low education, 24 
years old or more and south/southeast region) 
  
We are interested in understanding the effect that the current unemployment insurance component 
and the savings component of the Brazilian UB system have on exit probabilities from unemployment into 
formal and informal sector jobs, and how these probabilities change when benefits or contributions increase.  
To this end, we conduct six types of simulations that we apply to all groups described in the previous section: 
(i)  eliminating  unemployment  benefits;  (ii)  eliminating  FGTS;  (iii)  eliminating  both  UI  and  FGTS;  (iv) 
providing an additional  benefit of 40% of the mean of the worker’s wage distribution that is paid  for as long 
as they are unemployed; (v) increasing the contribution rate to finance unemployment benefits from currently 
zero14 to 5%; and (vi) increasing the contribution rate to 10%.15   The results are summarized in Figure 3, 4, 5 
and 6, respectively for eligible and non -eligible males and eligible and non-eligible women.  In each panel, 
there are three bars for each policy (6 triplets of bars) that give  the  percentage  change  in  the  transition 
probabilities.  Basically, changes in the percentage of workers moving into formal jobs, informal jobs, or 
remaining unemployed.  For non eligible males and females the policy changes only affect the value of future 
job offers, while for eligible males and females the changes affect both current benefits and the future value 
of the job offers. 
The results first show that the impact of the current unemployment insurance system (risk-pooling) 
on transitions rates out of unemployment is generally small, particularly for skilled workers. Among eligible 
individuals (males and females) removing the unemployment insurance component of the UB system would 
mainly increase transition probabilities into informal jobs (between 15 and 18 percent) and induce only a 
small reduction in the share of workers who remain unemployed. To interpret these results it is important to 
remember that removing unemployment insurance has two effects on transitions to formal sector jobs.  First, 
because there is no more unemployment compensation, the reservation wage falls and thus transitions to 
formal jobs should rise. On the other hand, the value of formal offers is reduced because of the absence of 
                                                           
14 Recall that the unemployment insurance component is financed from revenue taxes on employers.   
15 Today employers contribute 8% of workers salary to the savings accounts.  We assume that workers would be 
responsible for this contribution plus an additional 2 percentage points to finance unemployment benefits.   future benefits, making formal jobs less attractive and thus leading to a reduction in the value of waiting and 
an increase the relative value of informal job offers. Our results show that only  in the case of high skilled 
females the first effect dominates and thus transitions to formal jobs increase, albeit only slightly.   In all other 
cases, the transitions to formal jobs are reduced (by less than one percent).  The results are more pronounced 
for females than males and for low skilled individuals.  
For those who are not eligible the effects are similar. The main difference is that the probabilities of 
transition to formal jobs always declines, because this time the only effect is that formal jobs become less 
attractive and workers are less inclined to wait for them. As a result, transition probabilities into informal 
sector jobs increase and contribute to reduce the percentage of workers who remain unemployed. 
It  is very  important to  note  that,  as  we  had  discussed  in  the  introduction,  these  effects  of  the 
unemployment insurance system are conditional on its current design. To show this, we simulated the impact 
of giving unemployment benefits with replacement rates of 40 percent. Clearly, in that case, there would be 
major reductions in the transition probabilities to both formal and informal sector jobs, and an increase in the 
share of workers who remain unemployed - particularly among low income workers. 
The effects of removing FGTS are similar for both eligible and non-eligible individuals. Because 
formal  sector  jobs  become  less  attractive  (unemployment  savings  are  also  funded  exclusively  by  the 
employer16) workers have, again, fewer incentives to wait for them and are more likely to take informal sector 
jobs.  This reduces slightly the unemployment rate. In addition, eliminating entirely the UB system “ads” the 
negative effects that both unemployment insurance and FGTS have on the share of worker who remain 
unemployed. The largest “joint effect” that we find is for eligible women with medium education, for whom 
the share of those unemployed could be reduced by 3 percent and the transitions to informal jobs would 
increase by 21 percent. 
We finally look at the effects of asking workers to contribute to finance UI and FGTS – in both 
cases by reducing their wages. As before, the results are similar for eligible and non-eligible workers. The 
main effect of the pay-roll tax is to reduce the value of formal jobs and provide incentives to take informal 
sector jobs. Again, this also reduces slightly the length of the unemployment spell as individuals have fewer 
incentives to wait for formal sector jobs. 
   
                                                           
16 In this case eliminating FGTS could increase wages but the assumption here is that wages remain unchanged. Figure 3 - Change (%) on transition probabilities (men, eligible) 
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Figure 4 - Change (%) on transition probabilities (women, eligible) 
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Figure 6 - Change (%) on transition probabilities (women, non eligible) 
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In  this  paper  we  have  developed  a  simply  behavioral  model  where  workers  receive  formal  and 
informal job offers and decide whether to take them or wait.  We use the model to assess the impact of the 
Brazilian  unemployment  benefit  (UB)  system  on  transition  rates  out  of  unemployment  into  formal  and 
informal sector jobs.  After incorporating, in detail, the rules of the UB system, the parameters of the model 
were we estimated using a panel dataset of unemployed workers. We produced separate estimates for 30 
groups  of  workers  based  on  gender,  education  (low,  medium,  and  high),  region  (Northeast  and 
South/Southeast), age (younger and older than 24 years) and eligibility for unemployment benefits. Most of 
the  parameters  estimates  for  non-eligible  workers  are  statistically  significant  and  lead  to  monthly  offer 
probabilities ranging between 0.1% and 3.8% for formal jobs, and 4.4% and 25.6% for informal jobs. For 
eligible individuals, because of the small size of the sub-samples, some estimates were not significant. Overall, 
however, we find offer probabilities ranging between 2.0% and 4.8% for formal jobs and between 13.9% to 
29.5% for informal jobs.  We also report that there seems to be a clear positive trend in the probabilities of 
offer arrivals, indicating a non-stationary condition.  
We conducted six types of policy simulations: (i) eliminating unemployment benefits; (ii) eliminating 
FGTS; (iii) eliminating both UI and FGTS; (iv) providing a benefit of 40% of the mean of worker’s wage 
distribution  that  lasts  for  the  entire  unemployment  spell;  (v)  increasing  the  contribution  rate  to  finance 
unemployment benefits  from currently zero17 to 5%; and (vi) increasing the contribution rate to 10%.  The 
results suggest that the effects of the current unemployment insurance (UI) system and the unemployment 
savings account (FGTS) on exit rates from unemployment are small. The largest effects are obs erved among 
low and medium skilled workers, particularly women, but they remain modest. The main effect of the two 
systems is to reduce transitions into informal sector jobs. This happens because both UI and FGTS, which 
are financed by the employer, increase the value of formal sector jobs, thus providing incentives for workers 
to wait for these jobs  –  instead  of  taking  informal  jobs.  Thus,  indirectly,  UI  and  FGTS  also  affect 
unemployed workers who are not eligible for benefits.   
The results also show that, ultimately, the effect of the unemployment benefit system on workers 
behaviors depends on its design.  For instance, increasing the replacement rate and the duration of benefits of 
the UI system can reduce considerably transitions out of unemployment.  Similarly if, in the case of Brazil, 
workers had to contribute to finance unemployment insurance and unemployment savings, there would be 
less formal work. 
A general implication for policy is that, with a careful design, unemployment benefit systems can be 
used in middle income countries to provide better protection to workers, without having a major effect on 
the length of unemployment spells. Savings arrangements, in particular, would not create moral hazard while 
providing incentives to individuals to take formal sector jobs (as long as mandatory savings are not too high). 
                                                           
17 Recall that the unemployment insurance component is financed from revenue taxes on employers.   Unemployment insurance can also be an alternative but attention needs to be given to the level of the 
benefits. Benefits that are too high can have a negative impact on employment. 
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   Annex: The Brazilian unemployment benefits’ system 
The Brazilian Labor Market 
The Brazilian labor market can be characterized by a large informal sector and a high labor turnover 
(World Bank, 2002). However, it is important to state that the informal sector has been in a persistent and 
important decline, perhaps due to the increase in the education level of the work force (Melo and Santos, 
2009). Still, informality comprises roughly 50% of the labor force, according to IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística, or Brazilian National Statistical Agency). Informal workers, which includes basically 
self-employed  and  workers  sem  carteira  (without  contract),  do  not  have  any  access  to  income  protection 
systems. In accordance to the literature, formal workers in Brazil were considered those who had a signed 
labor card (signed carteira). 
Corseuil et al. (2003) find that the yearly job reallocation averaged 33% between 1991 and 1998, 
whereas  Bosch  and  Maloney  (2007)  show  that  the  average  job  tenure,  around  4.5  years  with  the  same 
employer for formal sector jobs, is one of the lowest in the world. They also show that the duration of self-
employment and informal sectors jobs is respectively 2.3 years and a little less than one year. 
According  to  Margolis  (2008),  there  are  two  contradictories  welfare  effects  of  this  high  labor 
turnover. First, a flexible labor market can facilitate job reallocations and therefore be growth enhancing, 
since low productivity jobs are not perpetuated. On the other hand, the high degree of income uncertainty 
might  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  well-being  of  individuals  and  in  the  economic  efficiency,  as  it  could 
encourage  the  unemployed  to  accept  any  offer  they  receive  (thereby  crowding  out  potentially  more 
productive  matches).  Another  harmful  effect  of  high  labor  turnover  is  the  disincentive  it  brings  to 
investments in human capital, again reducing the economic efficiency. 
 
Income Protection in Brazil 
Brazil  has  two  different  income  protection  systems:  A  traditional  risk  pooling  unemployment 
insurance (UI) and an unemployment individual savings account (UISA), named FGTS. According to current 
legislation, formal sector workers who lose their jobs after a certain number of months of contributions 
become eligible for unemployment insurance benefits and acquire the right to cash all the balance from their 
FGTS accounts. To be eligible for and trigger the start of UI, besides being fired, workers need to have held a 
formal sector job for at least 6 months in the previous 36-month period. 
 
The duration of the benefit ranges between 3 and 5 months depending on the contribution period. If 
contributions ranged between 6 to 11 months, workers receive 3 months of benefits; with 12 to 23 they get 4 
months and, finally, with 24 to 36 they receive 5 months. The benefit itself depends on average earnings during the contribution period: in 2010 the benefit ranged between R$  510 (the legally minimum wage, 
around US$ 280) and R$ 954.21 (around USD 530). For those whose average monthly salary is less than R$ 
841.89, the benefit formula is simply the minimum between R$ 510 and 80% of the average earnings. Above 
this intermediate boundary, benefits are smaller and limited by the top boundary. The benefit formula ensures 
that replacement rates are higher for low than for high income workers (see top-left panel of Figure 1). 
Normally, benefits are readjusted once a year, at the same time as the minimum wage. 
Besides  UI,  each  formal  worker  in  Brazil  has  an  UISA.  Employers  are  obliged  to  deposit  the 
equivalent to 8% of the monthly wage every month into these accounts, which are administrated by CAIXA, 
a federal bank. When fired without cause, workers are allowed to cash the balance accumulated in their FGTS 
accounts while working in their last job plus a dismissal fine equal to 40 percent of the accumulated assets. 
This is a lump sum payment. Other than dismissal without cause, workers have access to their balances in 
only a few scenarios (severe disease, retirement, death and housing, for instance). 
According to Robalino et al. (2009), the replacement rates offered by the UI system range between 
40 and 100 percent depending on the level of income. Taking both UI and FGTS together, the median 
worker  can  finance  between  3.5  and  8  months  of  salaries  depending  on  the  number  of  months  of 
contributions (see top-right panel of Figure 1) if fired without cause. Nonetheless, redistribution within the 
system seems to be regressive because low income workers have lower take-up rates and lower average 
benefits (see bottom panel of Figure 1). 
With respect to FGTS, there are basically two concerns. First, that it might provide incentives for 
fake dismissals in order to workers cash-out their savings. Robalino et al. (2009) argue that this could happen 
if the rates of return on FGTS savings were consistently below market (which indeed has been the case in 
recent  years),  if  the  mandate  for  precautionary  savings  is  too  high  and/or  credit  constraints  impede 
dissavings. Second, employers may prefer short-term contracts to avoid paying higher dismissal fines (Barros 
et al. 1999; Gonzaga, 2003). 
    
Figure A1:  Mandate of the Income Protection System and Redistribution 
 
Source: Robalino et al. (2009). 
 
Annex 2:  Testing the Validity of the Estimation ProcedureT 
The purpose of this section is to validate the methodology used to estimate the model parameters.  We do 
this by using simulated data (i.e., data generated with a known set of model parameters).  We can then 
compare whether the estimates are equal to the true parameter values.   
We start by running a simulation with 1,000 individuals characterized by their formal and informal wage 
distributions,  which  are  log-normally  distributed.    The  means  and  variances  that  define  these  wage 
distributions are sampled from exogenously defined normal distributions (one distribution for the means and 
one for the variances).   Individuals are followed over time, month by month, for a period of 40 years. Like in 
the model described in the main text, when unemployed they   are offered a formal or informal job with 
probabilities    and    respectively, which depend on the parameters             as indicated in the main 
text (we excluded the time trend).    If offered a job, the corresponding salary is sampled from their respective 
wage distributions.  Individual then decide to accept the offer based on the monetary values of the options.  
When employed, they can lose their job with a 0.025 probability if in the formal sector and with a 0.05 
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eWe store the “work histories” of all individuals, creating a database with a similar structure than the real data 
used in this paper.     The idea then is to apply the maximum likely-hood estimation described in the main 
text to recover the parameters              
In the exercise, the parameters were calibrated  so that the probability of an informal job offer was 0.2 in the 
first month of unemployment and 0.1 in the 6th month. Similarly, the probability of a formal job offer was 0.1 
in the first month and 0.05 in the 6th (See Figure A1). The coefficients respecting these constraints are: 
           ;            ;            ;            . 
 We define the likelihood function as described in section 4 of the main text. Figure A2 graphs this likelihood 
function with respect to    and    (holding    and    constant).  We notice that the function is smooth and 
has indeed a well-defined maximum.  The results of the optimization came up to be:           ;     
      ;            ;             – very close to the original values. 
 
















































InformalFigure A2: Likelihood function with respect to    and    
 